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THE UNAPPRECIATED IMPORTANCE, FOR SMALL 
BUSINESS DEFENDANTS, OF THE DUTY TO 
SETTLE 
Robert Heidt* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper suggests how the duty to settle, which requires liability insurers to 
pay damages awarded against their insured in excess of the policy limits1 when the 
insurers reject a reasonable settlement offer within the limits, may have indirectly 
led certain of their insureds—small business recreational vendors like horse riding 
stables or some motels offering swimming pools with diving boards—to sanitize 
the recreational activities they offer.  For example, horse riding stables, which 
before the duty to settle routinely offered their customers the opportunity to ride 
unaccompanied the horse the customer rented, now generally insist that all riders 
be accompanied.  Similarly, small motels2 no longer offer their customers Type II 
swimming pools—pools whose depth varies along a transition slope and which 
feature a one-meter diving board at the deep end.3   Instead, these motels either 
offer no pool or a relatively flat-bottomed shallow pool, and in no instance do such 
motels offer a pool with a diving board.  More generally, the duty to settle’s effect 
on the lawsuits injured customers brought against small business recreational 
vendors may have led a wide variety of such vendors to sanitize activities the 
vendors previously offered in a manner that disassociates the activities from the 
most severe injuries, but leaves them less enjoyable for many.4  While the loss of 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law. B.A. University of Wisconsin—Madison; J.D. University of Wisconsin Law 
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 1. The limits are the dollar maximum of the insured’s tort liability that the insurer will pay to 
plaintiffs who sue the insured.  Virtually all commercial and individual liability insurance policies sold 
in the U.S. contain such aggregate limits.  Liability insurance sold abroad typically contains no limits.  
For example, the minimum car liability insurance offered in England provides unlimited coverage for 
personal injury. Jörg Fedtke, Strict Liability for Car Drivers in Accidents Involving “Bicycle 
Guerillas”? Some Comments on the Proposed Fifth Motor Directive of the European Commission, 51 
AM. J. COMP. L. 941, 953 (2003). 
 2. The assumption here is that the small motels, whether individually owned or incorporated, are 
financially structured such that a tort judgment creditor of the motels cannot reach the assets of any of 
the wealthiest of organizations.  If the day arrives when such a creditor can reach the assets of large 
motel chains, typically among the wealthiest of organizations, this assumption will cease to be realistic.  
This paper has no application to the wealthiest of organizations, many of which self-insure.  
 3. The National Spa and Pool Institute (NSPI) classifies and sets minimum dimensions, including 
the minimum transition slope, for pools.  The NSPI also identifies what diving boards are appropriate 
for use in each class of pool.  A Type II pool, also known as a “hopper bottom” pool, can accommodate 
a range of one-meter diving boards.  See generally Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc., 5 P.3d 49 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2000) (describing NSPI services and Type II pools). 
 4. Other activities offered less often by small businesses recreational vendors include: rental of 
power equipment for waterskiing or jet skiing, rental of time on trampolines, rental of equipment for 
hang gliding and kite gliding, and rides on artificial bulls and snowmobiles.  In addition, day care 
centers are less likely to offer “adventure playgrounds” or any playgrounds whatsoever.  Special 
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such recreational activities in the modern era is commonly observed, no one has yet 
connected that loss to the duty to settle.  The hypothesis that the judicial embrace of 
the duty to settle has affected the activities recreational vendors offer, and thus 
affected the allocation of societies’ resources, warrants consideration, and not 
merely because the Coase Theorem maintains that in a first best world without 
transaction costs no legal rule should carry such an effect.5 
This paper’s scope is narrow. Others have discussed thoroughly whether the 
duty to settle is optimal in reducing the total amount jointly paid by tort defendants 
and their liability insurers.6  Still others have touched on whether the duty to settle 
is socially optimal when the interests of injured plaintiffs are also considered.7  
This paper remains agnostic on both matters.  Even the insight advanced here—that 
the duty to settle has led to the elimination of recreational activities that were 
enjoyed by many but in which a few were severely hurt—does not unequivocally 
support or oppose that duty. 
For the underlying insight, imagine a drunken motel customer who 
aggressively dives off a one meter diving board in a Type II pool, makes no effort 
to slow his descent through the transition slope, and continues his dive underwater 
into the shallow part of the pool until he crashes into the pool’s bottom and 
emerges a quadriplegic.   The customer then sues the motel, claiming its negligent 
design or operation of the pool, or its negligence in some other respect, caused his 
injuries.  The terrible nature of the customer’s injuries creates a potential damage 
award of eight figures, say $10 million.  Assuming the motel took all the cost-
justified precautions available to it that would have avoided this tragedy,8  we could 
                                                                                                     
statutes, rather than the common law, increasingly govern the liability of snow skiing areas and help to 
account for the continued availability of such areas. 
 5. Under the Coase Theorem, the defendant vendors should supply, and the plaintiff customers 
should buy, the socially optimal amount of the recreational activity regardless of the liability rule, as 
long as the plaintiff appreciates the risks of the activity.  However, this assumes that the amount of 
liability, when it is imposed, equals the plaintiff’s actual losses.  As we will see, the duty to settle affects 
the amount of liability, and there is no reason to believe the resulting amount equals the plaintiff’s actual 
losses.  Hence, it is consistent with the Coase Theorem that the duty to settle may have affected the 
allocation of resources.  See  STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 53, 127-31 
(1987) (applying Coase Theorem).  That the duty to settle leads to a result different from what would be 
expected in a world without transaction costs is unexceptional and without policy implications.  In such 
a world, there would not even be an economic rationale for firms. 
 6. See generally, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Judicial Limitations on the Discretion of Liability Insurers to 
Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1345 (1994) (positing situations where the 
duty to settle fails to maximize the joint expected wealth of liability insurers and their insureds).  Insofar 
as the duty to settle leads the lawyer hired by the insurer to deviate from the goal of maximizing the 
joint expected wealth of his clients, the insurer and the insured, the duty to settle conflicts with agency 
principles.  See Ellen S. Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities: Part 
I—Excess Exposure Cases, 78 TEX. L. REV. 599, 613 (2000).    
 7. See generally Kyle D. Logue, Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1375 
(1994) (considering how the duty to settle affects injured plaintiffs); Michael J. Meurer, The Gains 
From Faith in an Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts Between Defendants and Liability Insurers, 8 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 502 (1992) (considering whether the duty to settle is optimal when the interests of 
injured plaintiffs are also taken into account). 
 8. More generally, the assumption is that the motel would not be liable if the formal law was 
applied correctly.  For the motel to be liable under the formal law, the motel must be negligent, and its 
negligence must be the cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the customer’s injury. In addition, when the 
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estimate the customer’s chance of obtaining a judgment for $10 million to be as 
low as one percent, which may represent nothing more than the risks of legal 
system error.  Even with this remote chance of success, the expected value of the 
customer’s case would still be $100,000.  Realizing this, the customer may offer to 
settle for $100,000, which, let us assume, happens to be the limit of the motel’s 
liability insurance policy. 
Before the duty to settle,9 the liability insurer for the motel might well decide 
to refuse to settle for the $100,000 limits.  The liability insurer could comfortably 
refuse the settlement offer because the policy limits protected it against ever paying 
more, in indemnity at least,10 than $100,000.  Less obviously, the motel, while 
formally objecting to its insurer’s refusal to settle, might not be alarmed at that 
refusal  because it can protect its assets against a small risk of a $10 million 
judgment (on which it would owe $9.9 million and its insurer $100,000), thanks 
both to the protections provided by the widespread assumption that for claims 
against all but the wealthiest organizations, liability insurance limits amount to a de 
facto cap on tort damages,11 and to the protections provided by pro-debtor laws.12   
                                                                                                     
customer is contributorily negligent, his responsibility for his injury compared to the responsibility of 
the motel must not be so great as to eliminate the motel’s liability under the jurisdiction’s comparative 
negligence rule.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 6, 25 
(Proposed Final Draft  No. 1, 2005). 
 9. The rule that prevailed before courts embraced the duty to settle was called the laissez-faire rule 
because it reflected the terms of the insurance policy.  Those terms gave complete discretion to settle to 
the insurer.  See Meurer, supra note 7, at 507. 
 10. The insurer’s defense costs if the case went to trial could drive the insurer’s total payment 
beyond the policy limits.  Naturally, the insurer’s wish to avoid paying the extra defense costs it would 
incur if the litigation continues gives it some reason to accept plaintiff’s offer to settle at the limits, with 
or without the duty to settle.  On the other hand, plaintiff’s wish to avoid the legal expenses plaintiff will 
incur by continuing gives plaintiff a reason to accept less than the limits once the defendant rejects its 
offer to settle at the limits.    
 11. Amounts to be paid from the assets of the small business defendant, whether the small business 
is individually owned or incorporated, are referred to hereafter as “blood money.”   Amounts to be paid 
by the defendant’s liability insurance are referred to hereafter as “insurance money.”  Although all 
money ultimately comes from the insured, much recent scholarship contends that modern tort law is 
driven almost entirely by the wish to collect insurance money.  While suits for blood money occur, they 
are exceedingly rare.  See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law 
in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 289-90 (2001).  To be sure, Professor Baker describes blood 
money as money coming from the pockets of individual, rather than small business, defendants.  
However, suits for excess judgments to be paid by the assets of small businesses, whether individually 
owned or incorporated, are nearly as rare.  TEX. DEP’T. OF INS., THE 2002 TEXAS LIABILITY INSURANCE 
CLOSED CLAIM ANNUAL REPORT, at 4 fig.3 (2002), http://www.tdi.state.txus/reports/pd/taccar2002.pdf 
(reporting that there was a payment in excess of policy limits in only 31 out of 9,723 claims paid by 
liability insurance in 2002 and that the amount paid above the limits was approximately $9.5 million, 
compared to approximately $1.8 billion in total liability payments in Texas in 2002).  See also US 
TORTS COSTS: 2004 UPDATE 17 app.4 (2004), http://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/ 
reports/Tort_2004/Tort.pdf (confirming the low percentage of liability payments that come from the 
assets of the underinsured, both individual and corporate); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 
106 YALE L.J. 1, 40 n.176 (1996) (“There is little reason to expect that judgments in excess of policy 
limits are any more collectible from [small businesses] than from automobile owners and drivers.”).  
Uninsured sources account for only about one percent of automobile accident liability payments.  See 
ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS 48 (1964). 
 12. For the pro-debtor laws protecting individually owned small businesses, see generally Stephen 
G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603 (2006) (laws allowing 
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These two sources of protection render the motel and other small business 
defendants at least partially judgment-proof, should a tort judgment in excess of the 
limits materialize.13  Realizing that these protections afforded to the motel, along 
with the limits of the liability insurance policy, destroy his chance of actually 
collecting any judgment much beyond the limits, the injured customer can only 
react to the liability insurer’s refusal to settle for $100,000 by resigning himself to 
settling for less.  The costs of the motel’s liability insurer stay low, the premiums it 
charges the motel stay low, the coverage it offers remains available, and the insurer 
has little reason to pressure the motel to dismantle or redesign its Type II pool.  The 
motel and liability insurer together, one could say, have taken advantage of the 
policy limits, and, more fundamentally, of the judgment-proof status of the motel14 
to nullify the risk of actually having to pay a judgment much beyond the limits, 
and, likewise, to nullify the plaintiff’s advantages in negotiating a settlement which 
arise from that risk.  
After the duty to settle is imposed, the liability insurer for the motel no longer 
finds it in its interests to reject this offer to settle for the $100,000 policy limits.  
This is so because rejecting the offer would now expose the liability insurer to the 
risk of liability for the entire $10 million tort judgment.15  The insurer who rejects 
                                                                                                     
bankruptcy, exempting various types of assets and income from collection, and giving secured creditors 
priority over tort claimants, as well as other pro-debtor laws, render judgment-proof even individuals 
with substantial assets).  For the pro-debtor laws protecting small businesses that are incorporated, see 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1903-06 (1994) (laws 
allowing limited liability, secured debt strategies, exemption strategies, and Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
render judgment-proof incorporated small and medium size businesses); LoPucki, supra note 11, at 14-
19 (debtors can defeat enforcement of money judgments by using secured debt, third-party ownership, 
foreign haven, and exemption as judgment-proofing strategies). While LoPucki’s claim that even the 
wealthiest organizations may soon become judgment-proof is highly controversial, no one has 
challenged his claim that the large majority of small and medium size corporations have long been 
judgment-proof in regard to tort creditors. 
 13. All defendants who are judgment-proof in part, that is, all who will present the plaintiff with 
significant collection problems as a practical matter for any part of a judgment, are referred to as 
judgment-proof.  This is an unusually broad meaning of judgment proof,  which sweeps within its reach 
many small businesses not usually put in that category.  This broad meaning is justified by the 
scholarship suggesting that suits to collect blood money are rare and futile, even when suits are brought 
against firms and individuals with substantial assets.  See supra notes 11-12.  See also Tom Baker, 
Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 
CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 6-7 (2005).    
 14. The limits arise in the first place only because the motel’s knowledge of its partial judgment-
proof status leads it to prefer a policy with limits over a policy without limits.  It does not pay to buy 
unlimited liability insurance for a substantial yearly premium when the total amount that a judgment of 
liability will require one actually to pay is sharply limited by one’s assets or by the costs of invoking 
pro-debtor laws.  
Because a surprising number of defendants are judgment-proof, the number of instances in which 
these defendants and their liability insurers—in the absence of the duty to settle—could take advantage 
of the defendant’s judgment-proof status to negotiate a settlement well below the limits, as described in 
the example in the text, is also surprising.  By helping to neutralize this advantage, the duty to settle 
plays an important role. 
 15. Because a violation of the duty to settle may subject the liability insurer to a further judgment 
for bad faith in addition to a judgment in excess of the limits, the liability insurer has still more reason to 
accept the plaintiff’s offer.  See, e.g., Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos., 787 A.2d 376, 379 (Pa. 2001) 
(liability insurer who failed to settle at the limits made to pay $700,000 in addition to the excess 
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the settlement offer cannot eliminate the risk of such massive liability.  If the $10 
million judgment eventuates, there is a substantial risk that a court will find that the 
insurer’s rejection of the customer’s offer to settle for $100,000, merely one 
percent of that judgment, violated the duty to settle.16  Indeed, that offer, under the 
posited facts, approximates the expected value of the customer’s case.17  Nor would 
the insurer facing the $10 million judgment be able to avail itself of the protections 
afforded the motel.  The insurer would draw comfort from neither the hostility to 
collecting “blood money” from all but the wealthiest organizations nor from any 
pro-debtor laws.18  Because of the duty to settle, the insurer’s rejection of this offer 
to settle would likely even lose the loyalty of its insured, the motel, during the 
ensuing litigation.19  That rejection gives the defendant motel reason to enter an 
agreement with the plaintiff customer, called an assignment and covenant not to 
execute, whereby the motel assigns its rights against its insurer to the customer and 
                                                                                                     
judgment); Ecotech Int’l, Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison, 928 S.W.2d 648-50 (Tex. App. 1996) (insurer’s 
failure to settle forced insured to defend an execution proceeding, thus justifying, in part, a suit against 
insurer for more than the excess judgment). 
Still further pressure to accept a plaintiff’s offer comes from statutes in a number of states that begin 
awarding a plaintiff interest from the moment a settlement offer within the limits is rejected.  See, e.g., 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-192a(c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).       
 16. Jurisdictions differ on what, if any, culpability on the part of the insurer who rejects a settlement 
at the limits must be shown before it will be liable for the judgment in excess.  The literature on this 
subject is extensive.  See infra note 61.  As others have pointed out, the hindsight bias, arising from a 
sustainable trial verdict in excess of the limits, creates a virtual presumption that the insurer’s failure to 
accept plaintiff’s offer to settle at the limits was sufficiently culpable to trigger the duty to settle and 
thus hold the insurer liable for the judgment in excess.  See, e.g., Loudon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 360 N.W.2d 575, 581-82 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). See also Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
396 S.E.2d 766, 776 (W. Va. 1990).   
We believe that wherever there is a failure on the part of an insurer to settle 
within policy limits where there exists the opportunity to so settle and where such 
settlement within policy limits would release the insured from any and all 
personal liability, that the insurer has prima facie failed to act in its insured's best 
interest and that such failure to so settle prima facie constitutes bad faith towards 
its insured. 
Id.  
 17. The duty to settle is sometimes restated as the duty to accept settlement offers equal to the 
expected value of the plaintiff’s case.  See Logue, supra note 7, at 1391.  Estimating the expected value 
of a case is no simple matter.  It requires aggregating a series of potential outcomes by weighing the 
range of potential verdicts by their probability.  See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection 
of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6-12 (1984).  See also Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 
Cal. Rptr. 511, 518 n.2 (Ct. App. 1973) (noting in dicta that when the insured faces a remote possibility 
of very great liability, the duty to settle may require an insurer to settle in an amount that substantially 
exceeds the expected judgment). 
 18. The Michigan rule, an alternative version of the duty to settle, adopted only in Michigan, 
attempts to account for the defendant’s judgment-proof status and thereby would lead to the insurer 
paying less than the full excess judgment.  See Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 461 N.W.2d 666, 
667 (Mich. 1990). Administrative problems that arise from the difficulty of measuring the defendant’s 
assets available for collection plague the application of the Michigan rule, and its operation and effect 
are beyond the scope of this paper.  
 19. The cooperation clause in the insurance policy imposes on the insured a duty to cooperate, 
which would constrain the insured’s wish to assist the injured plaintiff in the ongoing litigation, except 
that the insurer’s violation of the duty to settle changes the insured’s obligations under the cooperation 
clause.  See Damron v. Sledge, 460 P.2d 997, 999 (Ariz. 1969). 
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aligns itself for litigation purposes with the customer.20  
The effects of the insurer paying the $100,000 limits of the policy in 
settlement, even when the merits seem so lopsided in the insured’s favor, are 
predictable.  The costs of the insurer increase, as must the premiums it charges the 
motel, and the motel has more difficulty finding coverage.  Most of all, liability 
insurers pressure all motel owners to dismantle Type II pools and, more generally, 
to avoid offering customers any activity in which the customers could suffer such 
an expensive injury.21  Given the risk of legal system error, the motel’s liability 
insurer will now find it prudent to pay a considerable amount to virtually every 
customer who suffers an expensive injury and who offers to settle at the policy 
limits.  
Granted, this effect of the duty to settle can be viewed positively by looking at 
the benefits the duty to settle confers on the plaintiff customer.  The, perhaps 
surprising, litigation support the injured customer may receive from the defendant 
motel, should the liability insurer reject the settlement offer, is the least of those 
benefits.  The much greater benefit is that the customer, once its offer to settle at 
the limits is rejected, will have on the hook for the full amount of any judgment a 
financially responsible party from whom the customer is virtually certain to collect 
without incurring any collection expense—the liability insurer.22  Indeed, this 
article could just as well be entitled “The Unappreciated Benefit for Severely 
Injured Plaintiffs of the Duty to Settle.”   
In sum, the duty to settle helps the severely injured plaintiff, or, more 
precisely, any plaintiff whose suit might result in a large judgment, bargain for the 
limits of the defendant’s liability insurance.  The duty to settle achieves this effect 
by making it harder for the small business defendant and its liability insurer to 
exploit the advantages that arise from the defendant’s judgment-proof status.  True, 
the duty to settle does not change the small business defendant’s judgment-proof 
status itself.  But when the plaintiff offers to settle at the policy limits, the duty to 
settle changes the calculation of advantages and disadvantages pertaining to that 
settlement offer that face the defendant’s liability insurer.  The liability insurer can 
no longer take advantage of the plaintiff’s knowledge of the defendant’s judgment-
proof status and of the ceiling that imposes upon the best possible outcome for a 
plaintiff continuing to litigate.  Before the duty to settle, the liability insurer could 
                                                                                                     
 20. In these agreements, the plaintiff promises not to attempt to collect blood money from the 
defendant in return for the defendant assigning to the plaintiff its action against its insurer for violating 
the duty to settle. Assignment and covenant not to execute agreements between the plaintiff and the 
insured defendant have become routine whenever a judgment in excess follows the insurer’s failure to 
accept a settlement within the limits.  The agreements amount to a procedural formality preparatory to a 
suit against the insurer for the excess judgment.  By statute, one state, Florida, authorizes the plaintiff 
who obtains an excess judgment to sue the liability insurer directly without an assignment by the 
insured.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155 (West through Jun. 2005 amendments).   
 21. They may do so through a refusal to write insurance for the motel altogether or through a 
significant increase in premium unless the motel dismantles the Type II pool.  Telephone interview with 
Walter Bennett, Enumclaw Ins. of Tacoma, Wash. (July 9, 2008); telephone interview with Douglas 
Hamm, K&K Ins. of Ft. Wayne, Ind. (June 24, 2008) (attributing their companies’ refusal to cover 
swimming pools with diving boards to the duty to settle). 
 22. Indeed, the insurer has a reputational interest in paying judgments promptly so as to keep its 
insureds happy. 
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reject plaintiff’s offer to settle at the limits secure in the knowledge that 
defendant’s judgment-proof status would prevent plaintiff from receiving much 
more.  In turn, plaintiff, knowing he would not collect a substantial part of any tort 
judgment he might win, would realize that his best response to the liability 
insurer’s rejection of his settlement offer was to accept a lesser settlement.  After 
the judicial embrace of the duty to settle, the best possible outcome of continuing to 
litigate for the plaintiff is as large as the maximum possible judgment.  The duty to 
settle deprives the liability insurer of a major advantage in negotiating for a 
settlement below the policy limits, an advantage that the insurer gains indirectly 
from the insured’s judgment-proof status. 
Accordingly, those who are confident that judgments for plaintiff are 
warranted and who, therefore, dismiss the risk of legal system error, or believe the 
risk of error cuts both ways equally, will applaud this effect of the duty to settle.  
From their perspective, the partial judgment-proof character of the small business 
defendant creates an obvious externality, which invites such defendants to 
underinvest in safety.23  The wish to correct that externality provides a powerful 
reason for embracing the duty to settle, a reason not yet fully appreciated.24    
On the other hand, the duty to settle forces recreational vendors and their 
liability insurers to come to terms with a harsh fact about our tort system.  The 
harsh fact is that whenever a potential tort plaintiff suffers an expensive injury and 
whenever plaintiff (thanks, for example, to the duty to settle) can directly or 
indirectly sue a party, like a liability insurer, from whom a judgment can be fully 
and reliably collected without expense or delay, the risk of legal system error alone 
gives a tort claim for that expensive injury a significant expected value, and 
correspondingly creates significant tort exposure for the liability insurer.25  While 
this harsh fact seems obvious, the significant tort exposure impacts recreational 
vendors (especially those whose activities are associated with expensive injuries) in 
various ways.  One negative impact is that such vendors are pressured by their 
liability insurers to take precautions that disassociate their activities from severe 
injuries, even though the precautions are not cost-justified and, hence, are not 
socially desirable.  The precaution of dismantling all formerly commonplace Type 
II pools with their one-meter diving board may be an example.  Under the formal 
law, the recreational vendor should only be liable when it was negligent either in 
the manner in which it offered the activity or in offering the activity itself, its 
negligence was the cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the customer’s injury, and 
any responsibility for the customer’s injury arising from the customer’s 
contributory negligence is not so great as to eliminate the recreational vendor’s 
                                                                                                     
 23. See Steve Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45-46 (1986).  
Many others have commented on this externality and its tendency to discourage defendants from taking 
cost-justified precautions. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Refusal to Settle by Liability Insurers: 
Some Implications of the Judgment-Proof Problem, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 77, 81-82 (1994). 
 24. A few courts have discussed how the duty to settle can overcome problems presented by the 
defendant’s judgment-proof status. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696 
(Tex. 1996). 
 25. This generalization gains support from the medical malpractice literature. David A. Hyman, 
Medical Malpractice and the Tort System: What Do We Know and What (If Anything) Should We Do 
About It?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1639, 1643-44 (2002) (“Indeed, the best predictor of the size of an award is 
the severity of disability, not whether there was negligence or an adverse event.”). 
2010] DUTY TO SETTLE 83 
liability under the jurisdiction’s comparative negligence rule.26  Imposing liability 
on the recreational vendor when these requirements are not supported by sufficient 
evidence plainly represents legal system error.  Yet the many huge judgments for 
injuries in swimming pool and diving board cases suggest, in this context at least, 
that legal system errors are common and one-sided in favor of the plaintiffs.27   One 
court has come close to expressly basing an eight-figure judgment for plaintiff on 
defendant’s mere knowledge that a user of Type II pool can emerge from the pool 
as a quadriplegic.28  Hence, despite being reasonably safe for those who use it with 
minimal care, the Type II pool’s association with expensive tort injuries creates 
significant tort exposure for the liability insurer of the motel that offers the pool, as 
well as for the liability insurer of the pool’s installer, manufacturer, and standards 
development organization.  
One reason the motel’s mere association with expensive injuries creates 
significant tort exposure arises from the weakness of the modern concept of 
negligence. While negligence at one time meant the failure to provide average care 
or the care that a reasonable person would have provided, it has evolved to mean 
the mere failure to provide any cost-justified precaution.  However, one who takes 
every cost-justified precaution is acting not with average care, but with optimal 
(i.e., perfect) care.29  Many older opinions, in which courts sharply distinguish 
negligent behavior from mere sub-optimal behavior, for which the defendant will 
                                                                                                     
 26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 6, 25 (Proposed 
Final Draft  No. 1, 2005). 
 27. See, e.g., Bunch v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 780 (Ct. App. 2004) (affirming $12 
million damage award when defendant was negligent in its signage against diving); Hendrickson v. 
King County, 2 P.3d 1006 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (defendant was negligent in its signage of pool depth); 
Ziecker v. Town of Orchard Park, 551 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1989) (affirming $15 million damage award 
where defendant was  negligent in its signage of pool depth); Hooks v. Wash. Sheraton Corp., 578 F.2d 
313, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (affirming damage award where defendant installed diving board with too 
much spring); Johnston v. Nebraska, No. A-00-373, 2001 Neb. App. LEXIS 189 (Neb. Ct. App. Aug. 
28, 2001) (defendant negligent for signage and for having diving board with too much spring); Dodson 
v. Henderson Props., Inc., 708 P.2d 1064 (Okla. 1985) (reinstating $3 million damage award where 
defendant was negligent in its signage and fencing); Murray v. Ramada Inns Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 
1988) (defendant was negligent in its signage of pool depth and in its failure to provide lifeguard 
services); Jacques v. Vill. of Lake Placid, 332 N.Y.S.2d 743 (App. Div. 1972) (defendant was negligent 
in its signage); Pleasant v. Blue Mound Swim Club, 262 N.E.2d 107 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) (defendant was 
negligent in not maintaining adequate depth under diving board).  
 28. Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc., 5 P.3d 49, 51, 57 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming $11 million 
award and suggesting the mere knowledge of the standard development organization for the pool 
industry, the National Spa and Pool Institute, that a person who used a pool meeting its standards could 
strike the bottom forcefully enough to be severely injured rendered the NSPI negligent for promulgating 
those standards).  See also King v. Nat’l Spa & Pool Inst. Inc., 570 So. 2d 612, 618 (Ala. 1990) (NSPI 
will be liable to injured diver if pool conformed to NSPI standards and NSPI was negligent in 
promulgating the standards).  Restatement (Third) of Torts has adopted the rationale of King.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 43 cmts. c, e, f (Proposed Final 
Draft  No. 1, 2005). 
 29. At least one Commentator recognizes how the adoption of the Learned Hand formula for 
negligence tends to impose strict liability. See Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, 
Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 293 (1988) 
(basing a finding of negligence on compliance errors amounts to strict liability). 
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not be liable, seem to be ignored.30  One consequence is that in order to reach a 
jury, a customer need only advance sufficient evidence of some untaken precaution 
that would have been cost-justified and would probably have avoided or reduced 
the customer’s injury.  A motel customer who suffers a severe injury in the motel’s 
Type II pool can produce sufficient evidence of the motel’s negligence merely by 
adducing testimony from an expert witness identifying, for example, some cost-
justified improvement in the signage indicating the depth of the pool at various 
points. Hence, defendant’s signage could have been negligent because it was in the 
wrong location or in the wrong size print, was insufficiently specific or was too 
specific, or was insufficiently visible, intelligible, emphatic, or memorable.31  The 
ease of advancing one of these theories of causal negligence—and modern 
procedure encourages a plaintiff to advance multiple, alternative theories—
contrasts with the intellectual labor required of a conscientious trial judge to 
evaluate whether there is sufficient evidence in support of the theory and to explain 
why there is not.  Moreover, the trial judge knows he must undertake this labor in 
the shadow of the deeply entrenched principle that negligence and cause-in-fact, 
whenever sensible minds can differ, are for the jury.32  The weakness of the modern 
concept of negligence, combined with this commitment of the key elements in 
negligence cases to the jury, creates a risk of legal system error—in the form of 
sending meritless cases to the jury—that is substantial and one-sided.33  Nor is the 
jury likely to correct these errors.  At least when plaintiff emerges, as a 
quadriplegic, the severity of plaintiff’s injury is all too likely to overthrow the 
                                                                                                     
 30. See, e.g., Saunders v. Boston & Me. R.R., 136 A. 264 (N.H. 1927) (finding defendant not 
negligent despite its failure to equip trolley with a jack); Cordas v. Peerless Transp. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 
198 (City Ct. 1941) (defendant was not negligent despite his omission of a cost-justified precaution that 
would probably have avoided plaintiff’s injury); Watkins v. Taylor Furnishing Co., 31 S.E.2d 917, 918 
(N.C. 1944) (defendant was not negligent despite his failure to act as the “perfectly prudent” man); 
Porter v. Cook, 13 S.E.2d 486, 488 (S.C. 1941) (defendant “[was] not guilty of negligence if he [made] 
such a choice as a person of ordinary prudence placed in such a position might make, even though he 
did not make the wisest choice”).  Professor George Priest described the pre-1960 notion of negligence 
as requiring “‘clear moral culpability substantially antagonistic to social norms.’”  Gary T. Schwartz, 
The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 623 
n.104 (1992).  
 31. Cases in which defendant’s signage was deemed negligent include Falgoust v. Richardson 
Indus., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (damages of $975,000) and Gould v. Allstar Ins. Co., 
208 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 1973).  See also cases cited supra note 27. 
 32. Determining whether a party’s conduct is negligent requires evaluation, not just fact-finding.  
Courts have long assigned such determinations of mixed law and fact to the jury, provided only that 
there is sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s conclusion.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 8 (Proposed Final Draft  No. 1, 2005).  The power thereby given the 
jury in negligence cases is so long-standing that its implications are rarely considered.   
 33. As one frustrated judge stated in dissent: “There can be nothing more tragic than quadriplegia . . 
. .The easiest and most natural inclination for a trial court in a swimming pool/dive case is to ‘give the 
plaintiff a day in court.’”  Jonathan v. Kvaal, 403 N.W.2d 256, 267 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (Randall, J., 
dissenting).  For the unwillingness of courts to keep such cases from the jury, see Greg Sobo, Comment, 
Look Before You Leap: Can the Emergence of the Open and Obvious Danger Defense Save Diving 
From Troubled Waters?, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 175, 182 (1998); Saul Wilensky & Steven B. Getzoff, 
The Shallow Dive: An Open and Obvious Danger, FOR THE DEF., Nov. 1991, at 3. 
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requirement of causal negligence as the foundation for defendant’s liability.34 
One could say a Type II pool’s association with such an expensive injury 
renders such a pool an example of what has been called a litogen.35  A litogen is 
any aspect of an activity that causes more liability than would be warranted by the 
activities’ dangerousness.36  Without the duty to settle, liability insurers for small 
businesses could tolerate such a litogen in the businesses of their insureds.  The 
judicial embrace of the duty to settle meant the end of such tolerance, and, hence, 
the disappearance of such activities.37 
Society suffers when the law suppresses recreational activities merely because 
a customer can perform the activity in a way that leads to severe and, as measured 
by the tort system, expensive injuries.  Absent proof of the elements officially 
required for liability, there is no more reason to “internalize” on those offering a 
Type II pool the injury costs associated with the pool than to “internalize” on 
surgeons the injury costs associated with surgery.38  True, an occasional legal 
scholar calls for eliminating American football from society by imposing tort 
liability on those offering the sport for all injuries the sport engenders.39  But that 
call—by ignoring the benefits of recreational activities, both internal to the 
participants and external to society—seems sure to continue unheeded.40 
                                                                                                     
 34. Thus far no courts have considered the proposed changes in tort doctrine or procedure designed 
to reduce the risk of legal system error in suits against recreational vendors.  For examples of these 
proposed changes, see Robert Heidt, The Avid Sportsman and the Scope for Self-Protection: When 
Exculpatory Clauses Should Be Enforced, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 381 (2004); Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks 
and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY L.J. 1, 121-42 (1993). 
 35. The term was originally used by Robert L. Brent, M.D., to describe Bendectin, a drug used to 
combat nausea in pregnant women and the source of much litigation.  As a result of the litigation, 
Bendectin was pulled off the market by its manufacturer in 1983 without ever being proven to cause 
birth defects.  Benedictin Making a Comeback, March of Dimes, http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20060213170440/http://www.marchofdimes.com/professionals/681_1820.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 
2009).  Hence, Dr. Brent called it a “litogen,” (a substance that causes liability), a word similar to 
carcinogen (a substance that causes cancer), and teratogen (a substance that causes birth defects).  See 
PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW 28 (Kenneth R. Foster et al., eds., 1993). 
 36. In support of the claim that a pool with a diving board is a litogen, see Sobo, supra note 33, at 
175-77 (describing how such pools trigger disproportionate litigation but never using the term 
“litogen”). 
 37. See sources cited supra note 21 (attributing their companies’ refusal to cover pools with diving 
boards to the duty to settle). 
 38. Indeed, there is less reason for liability here.  In the surgery context, imposing liability on a 
defendant will not dilute the incentive for plaintiffs to take precautions to avoid injury to themselves 
because there is little, if any, role for plaintiff’s precaution-taking.  In the recreational activity context, 
on the other hand, maintaining proper incentives for the plaintiff to protect himself plays a much greater 
role in avoiding injuries.  Imposing liability for plaintiff’s injuries in that context threatens to dilute 
those incentives. 
 39. See RAYMOND L. YASSER, TORTS AND SPORTS: LEGAL LIABILITY IN PROFESSIONAL AND 
AMATEUR ATHLETICS 82 (1985) (maintaining that if the injury costs of football in U.S. society were 
internalized, the sport would disappear and that “this would surely be a healthy development”).  
Contrast the view of Justice Handler of the Supreme Court of New Jersey: “One might well conclude 
that something is terribly wrong [when] the most commonly-accepted aspects of play—a traditional 
source of a community’s conviviality and cohesion—spurs litigation.”  Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 
607 (N.J. 1994). 
 40. For classic discussions of the benefits of recreational activities that involve risk-taking, see 
KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 243-45 (Marjorie Kerr Wilson trans., Harcourt, Brace & World, 
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Part II of this Article explains more fully the duty to settle and surveys the 
considerations that support and oppose it.  Part III anticipates a major objection to 
my hypothesis that the duty to settle has indirectly led small business recreational 
vendors to eliminate or sanitize the activities they offer.  That objection maintains 
that in the era before the duty to settle was embraced the risk facing the defendant 
small business of an excess judgment for “blood money” was greater than I have 
suggested.  As a result, I have overstated the bargaining advantage the liability 
insurer gained from the partial judgment-proof status of the defendant.  This 
objection maintains that, even without the duty to settle, plaintiff’s threat to press 
on after plaintiff’s offer to settle at the limits was rejected needed to be taken more 
seriously.  My response largely tracks the work of previous scholars who have 
emphasized the practical difficulties plaintiffs face in suing for and collecting blood 
money from all but the wealthiest organizations.  These scholars argue persuasively 
that plaintiffs who sue small businesses rationally treat the limits of defendant’s 
liability policy as a de facto cap on their recovery.  In the absence of the duty to 
settle, or of some other method for giving plaintiffs access to unlimited liability 
insurance, the plaintiffs understandably resign themselves to bargaining down from 
those limits.  By undermining the effect of those limits, the duty to settle 
dramatically increases the insurer’s exposure, especially for severe injuries, and, 
hence, leads the insurer to pressure its insured to alter its activities so as to reduce 
the chance, for whatever reason, of a customer suffering a severe injury. 
II. THE MERITS OF THE DUTY TO SETTLE 
While courts have shown no inclination to reconsider their embrace of the duty 
to settle, the identification here of a previously unappreciated effect of that duty 
justifies a brief review of the duty’s merits.  The duty to settle maintains that a 
liability insurer, who refuses to accept a reasonable settlement offer from a tort 
plaintiff that is within the limits of the liability insurance policy between the insurer 
and the tort defendant, will be liable to its insured, the tort defendant, for the full 
amount of any tort judgment that the tort plaintiff may eventually win.41  When the 
tort judgment exceeds the limits of liability set forth in the insurance policy, those 
limits are ignored.  The insured tort defendant enforces the duty to settle through a 
post-judgment suit against its insurer, although the insured’s right to bring that suit 
is often assigned to the injured plaintiff.42  
Although the concept of the duty to settle predates it,43 the case most 
associated with the duty to settle is Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance 
                                                                                                     
Inc. 1966) (1963)); WHY MAN TAKES CHANCES: STUDIES IN STRESS-SEEKING 10 (Samuel Z. Klausner 
ed. 1968); M. J. ELLIS, WHY PEOPLE PLAY 80 (1973); MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE 72 (1990). 
 41. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co, 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).  The duty to settle has been 
expressly recognized in forty-seven states.  The District of Columbia, Hawaii, Nevada, and West 
Virginia have never addressed the cause of action.  See STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH LIABILITY: A 
STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW 89-134 (1987) (collecting citations). 
 42. Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1120 n.15 (1990).  Florida provides 
by statute that the tort plaintiff can sue the defendant’s liability insurer directly.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
624.155 (West, Westlaw through Jun. 2005 amendments). 
 43. See Wis. Zinc Co. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 155 N.W. 1081 (Wis. 1916). 
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Co.44  In Comunale, an insured car driver injured two pedestrians in a crosswalk.45  
The driver’s insurer, Traders and General Insurance Co., refused to settle the 
pedestrians’ negligence suits against the driver even after the pedestrians together 
offered to settle for $4,000, which was well below the policy limits of $10,000 per 
person and $20,000 per accident.46  The ensuing tort litigation ended in judgment 
for the pedestrians against the driver for $25,000 for one pedestrian and $1,250 for 
the other.47  When the judgment was not paid, the pedestrians entered an agreement 
with the driver, whereby they received an assignment of the driver’s rights against 
its insurer, and then brought suits against the insurer to recover the full amount of 
the tort judgment, including the $15,000 in excess of the $10,000 limit per 
person.48   
The Supreme Court of California upheld the claim of the pedestrians and of the 
car driver against Traders and General Insurance Co.49  The court held that Traders 
and General Insurance Co. violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, implicit in their liability insurance policy with the car driver, when it 
refused to accept the pedestrians’ offer to settle for $4,000.50  The appropriate 
remedy for breaching this implied covenant, the court held, was to render the 
insurance company liable for the full amount of any judgment, even a judgment in 
excess of the policy limits, that its insured would eventually face.51 
The court condemned the liability insurer’s exercise of its right to refuse to 
accept the pedestrians’ offer to settle, a right clearly granted the insurer by the 
terms of the policy, because it saw the refusal as opportunism designed to prefer 
the insurer’s interests when they conflicted with the insured’s.52  The pedestrians’ 
offer to settle within the limits brought into relief the conflict between the insured’s 
indifference to any payment within the limits and his wish to avoid a judgment in 
excess of the limits, on the one hand, and the insurer’s wish to avoid payment at the 
limits and its indifference to a judgment in excess of the limits, on the other hand.  
Obviously, it will always be in the insured’s interest to settle within the policy 
limits when there is any danger, however slight, of a judgment in excess of those 
limits.53  In stark contrast, once the settlement has consumed the limits of the 
insurer’s potential liability, the insurer is indifferent to how much of the insured’s 
assets a judgment or settlement above the limits will take.  Hence, a settlement at 
                                                                                                     
 44. 328 P.2d 198.  See also Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).  
The duty to settle is sometimes called the “Comunale duty.”  See, e.g., Commercial Union Assurance 
Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d 1038 (Cal. 1980). 
 45. Comunale, 328 P.2d at 200. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 203. 
 50. Id. at 200-02. 
 51. Comunale, 328 P.2d at 202. 
 52. See id.  
 53. I am referring solely to the financial interests of the insured in the particular suit against him.  
The insured who requests his insurer to pay the plaintiff the amount of the policy limits may injure his 
longer term interests in maintaining his reputation and in qualifying for lower premiums and better 
coverage.  Implicit in that request, after all, is some admission of the insured’s liability, and usually of 
his culpability. 
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the policy limits (before the duty to settle was recognized) represented the worst 
possible outcome for the insurer, with its only benefit for the insurer, beyond the 
reputational gain from protecting its insured, being the savings in defense costs 
from avoiding further litigation.  Accordingly, rejecting a settlement at the limits 
furthered the insurer’s interests, as long as that rejection reduced the insurer’s 
expected payment to the plaintiff more than it increased the insurer’s expected 
defense costs.  The court in Comunale could not abide the insurer acting on these 
self-interested calculations.  Doing so, the court felt, was wholly inconsistent with 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and with the fiduciary 
relationship toward the insured that the court felt the policy created.54  The court 
saw the duty to settle as a rule that would prevent the insurer from preferring its 
own interests in the face of this conflict.55  
Subsequent courts have based the duty to settle on additional grounds as well. 
They have emphasized the insurer’s total control, under the terms of the policy, of 
the disposition of suits against the insured and the consequent relinquishment by 
the insured of any right to negotiate with the plaintiff on his own behalf.56  
Courts—ignoring the possibility that the insured will be judgment proof—have 
also made much of the harm to the insured’s interests from a judgment in excess of 
the policy limits and the resulting dependence by the insured on the insurer to see 
that this severe harm is avoided.57  Citing these and other grounds, such as 
encouraging settlement,58 courts have, without exception, held the insurer to the 
obligations of a fiduciary or an agent of the insured, brushed aside the contrary 
language of the policy,59 and imposed on the insurer the duty to settle.60 
The precise contours of the duty to settle still vary from state to state.61  The 
plurality of states apply the duty to settle (with its resulting liability in excess of the 
policy limits) when defendant’s rejection of plaintiff’s offer to settle was negligent.  
In these states the court or jury must reconstruct ex post all the factors bearing on 
the insurer’s judgment ex ante as to the expected outcome of the litigation.  Merely 
ascertaining what information was available to the insurer at the time of the 
plaintiff’s offer presents a challenge.  Other states apply the duty to settle when an 
insurer of a policy without limits would have accepted plaintiff’s offer to settle.  In 
these states the duty to settle becomes even more difficult to apply.  In dicta, the 
                                                                                                     
 54. Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201-02. 
 55. See id. at 202. 
 56. See Syverud, supra note 42, at 1122. 
 57. See, e.g., Georgetown Realty, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 831 P.2d 7, 14 (Or. 1992); Transp. Ins. 
Co., Inc. v. Post Express Co., Inc., 138 F.3d 1189, 1192 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 58. In fact, however, by increasing the variance in potential outcomes from the litigation, the duty to 
settle diminishes the likelihood of settlement.  See Priest & Klein, supra note 17, at 15-16 (the greater 
the variance in expected outcomes, the less the chance of settlement). 
 59. Granted, the policy limits define the amount the insurer must pay to perform the contract, and, 
hence, do not necessarily define the amount for which the insurer may be liable upon breach of the 
contract.  Lawton v. Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 579 (N.H. 1978).  
 60. For a review of cases, state by state, adopting the duty to settle, see Ashley, supra note 41. 
 61. For a review of those contours, see generally Victor E. Schwartz, Statutory Strict Liability for 
an Insurer’s Failure to Settle: A Balanced Plan for an Unresolved Problem, 1975 DUKE L.J. 901; 
Patrick F. Koenen, Bad Faith and Negligence Approaches to Insurer Excess Liability for Failing to 
Settle Third-Party Claims: Problems and Suggestions, 54 DEF. COUNS. J. 179 (1987). 
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court in the leading case of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, 
Connecticut,62 suggested an alternative strict liability standard that would apply the 
duty to settle whenever an insurer rejects a settlement offer within the policy 
limits.63 Although no state has officially embraced the strict liability rule, the rules 
that have been embraced amount to virtual strict liability in their operation.64  
The difficulty of applying the duty to settle is not the only argument against 
the duty that courts have ignored.  For instance, courts rarely acknowledge the 
assumptions underlying the duty to settle.  One assumption is that the reputational 
harm to liability insurers of exposing their insureds to an excess judgment fails to 
create an adequate incentive for the insurer to settle within the limits.  Another 
assumption is that insureds at no time possess the ability and leverage to persuade 
their insurers to settle in order to further the insured’s interests.  Courts ignore the 
possibility that the insured may have consciously opted for a low-limit policy with 
full knowledge of the possible conflict of interest and the risk of opportunistic 
behavior by the insurer that a low-limit policy presents.  After all, an insured with 
few assets or little reluctance to exploit pro-debtor laws like bankruptcy may feel 
that the risk of actually having to pay an excess judgment is so remote that a 
modest limit on her liability insurance will sufficiently protect her.  She may feel 
the additional premiums she would need to pay for a policy with greater limits will 
swamp whatever reduced concern about her liability those premiums would 
provide.  By imposing the duty to settle, courts reward such an insured for reneging 
on her bargain and for initially choosing to purchase a low-limit policy.  The duty 
to settle then, by so rewarding the buyer of the low-limit policy, narrows the price 
differential between low and high-limit policies. 65  
Insureds in general also pay more because the duty to settle hinders insurers 
faced by an offer to settle within the limits from bargaining strategically so as to 
reduce the total payments of insurers, and thus, the future premiums of insureds.  
Both insurers and future insureds, for example, may benefit from the insurer 
rejecting a settlement offer within the limits in the hope of negotiating a lower 
settlement later.  In other words, rejecting the plaintiff’s settlement offer may 
improve the insurer’s position in further negotiations regardless of whether it 
                                                                                                     
 62. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967). 
 63. See id. at 177.  Others have also called for strict liability whenever a refusal to settle within the 
limits is followed by a judgment in excess of the limits.  See, e.g., Robert W. Peterson, Excess Liability: 
Reconsideration of California’s Bad Faith Negligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REV. 475, 482-85 (1966). 
 64. See, e.g., John A. Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 KY. L.J. 
100, 109 (1938) (arguing that jurors are “totally incompetent” and “unqualified” to say whether a 
settlement offer was reasonable); Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for 
Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1136, 1140-42 (1954) (expecting little difference in the result regardless 
of which test is applied, given the hindsight bias of the jury); 1 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS 
AND DISPUTES, § 5.12 (5th ed. 2007) (arguing that tests, however stated, lead to the same results); 
Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 776 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that an award of 
damages beyond the limits creates a presumption that a settlement within the limits should have been 
accepted). 
 65. This narrowing of the price differential results primarily from the insurer’s need to increase 
premiums for low-limit policies to reflect the unlimited liability risk that would often accompany such 
policies because of the duty to settle.  See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 889 
(Student ed. 1988) (contending that the duty to settle may increase the insurer’s cost of servicing low-
limit policies). 
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makes sense in light of the expected outcome of the case overall.  Another example 
of strategic bargaining which may reduce the overall payments of insurers and the 
future premiums of insureds would be rejecting an offer within the limits in order 
to deter similar claims in the future.  Courts seem appalled when this strategic 
behavior results in an excess judgment against an insured.  But by imposing the 
duty to settle, they prevent all insureds and insurers from realizing the savings this 
strategic bargaining by the insurer would allow.66  
Other costs of the duty to settle include the legal expenses insurers incur in 
defending duty to settle cases.  These expenses are part of the costs of claims 
administration, which in turn affect insurance premiums.  Because the insurer’s 
liability for an excess judgment is not strict, at least not officially, the liability 
insurer will predictably incur costs in attempting to show that its rejection of the 
plaintiff’s settlement offer was not so culpable as to meet whatever legal standard 
for culpability will trigger the duty to settle in the relevant jurisdiction.  Sowing the 
documentary seeds so it can later show its lack of culpability in rejecting the 
settlement offer will raise the liability insurer’s costs.  Insurers will artfully conduct 
negotiations, and prepare claims files, to build a record that establishes their lack of 
culpability.  The insurer’s attorneys and claims adjustors will respond to the 
plaintiff’s settlement offers, and to their insured’s request that the insurer settle, so 
as to justify their behavior in the eyes of the fact-finder at a later trial.  Of course, 
these efforts to build a favorable record are wasted whenever no excess judgment 
ensues.67  
Further evidence that the duty to settle fails to maximize the joint benefit of the 
parties comes from the parties’ failure to impose the duty to settle on the insurer 
through voluntary agreement.  Even in commercial policies, where the insured is 
apt to be a sophisticated buyer not subject to information failure or any monopoly 
power of the seller, the policy terms give full discretion over settlement to the 
insurer.  The Coase Theorem suggests that the bargaining process between the 
insured and the insurer ought to yield jointly optimal policy terms.  As Professor 
Sykes has written:  
[T]he prevalence of competition in the industry, a concern for reputation on the 
part of insurers, and insurer’s desire to maximize customer willingness to pay in 
relation to costs all provide an incentive for [insurers] to offer jointly optimal 
terms.  The absence of any contractual obligation [on the insurer] to the insured 
regarding the disposition of settlement offers then affords some evidence that such 
an obligation is undesirable from the parties’ perspective.68 
                                                                                                     
 66. Occasionally, the benefits to the liability insurers from bargaining strategically may lead them to 
refuse a settlement at the limits despite the duty to settle.  Charles Silver, A Missed Misalignment of 
Interests: A Comment on Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 77 VA. L. REV. 1585 (1991) (positing when an 
insurer may sensibly reject a reasonable settlement demand at the limits).   
 67. These expenses, which are socially wasteful in any event, would be avoided by making the 
insurer strictly liable for rejecting a settlement within the limits.  See Schwartz, supra note 61, at 910. 
 68. Sykes, supra note 23, at 79.  Sykes has written elsewhere: 
If a simple constraint on insurer discretion such as the [duty to settle] rule were 
broadly valuable in insurance contracts, it could easily be included in standard 
forms among existing policy terms.  Thus, for the transaction costs of drafting to 
explain the omission of constraints on insurer discretion in settlement, the 
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Professor Sykes has also pointed out that the usual grounds for explaining the 
parties’ failure to bargain to optimal terms do not seem to apply here.  He has 
emphasized the absence of transaction costs that would prevent the insured from 
appreciating the consequence of relieving the insurer of a duty to settle.69  Indeed, 
because insurance contract provisions are standardized and must be approved by 
insurance regulators, the cost per customer of including optimal contractual terms 
is much less than with most contracts.  Therefore, if a provision existed that was 
appropriate for most insureds and superior to the current one vesting authority to 
settle in the insurer, it could readily be incorporated.  
III. THE UBIQUITY OF THE JUDGMENT-PROOF 
This Article claims that the duty to settle drives a liability insurer to accept an 
offer to settle at the policy limit as long as the plaintiff’s injury is severe and the 
potential judgment against its insured is correspondingly large, even in a case the 
insurers view as being without merit.  As a result, liability insurers become 
especially motivated to suppress the risk of their insured’s activity leading, 
however innocently, to a severe injury.  One objection to this claim is that even 
without the duty to settle, the insurer’s wish to protect its small business insured 
from having to pay blood money will lead it to accept these offers to settle at the 
limits.  This objection collides head-on with a stubborn fact: the almost negligible 
likelihood that the small business will ultimately need to pay blood money.70  
The assumption that for claims against all but the wealthiest organizations 
                                                                                                     
appropriate constraints must vary across policyholders to such an extent that 
attempts to standardize them would be unproductive.  Any universally applicable 
judicial default, such as the [duty to settle] rule, then becomes highly suspect. 
Sykes, supra note 6, at 1357-58.  Because courts will nullify any attempt by the insured and insurer to 
contract out of the duty to settle, one cannot cite the parties’ failure to make such an attempt as evidence 
that they find the duty to settle worthwhile.  Id. at 1359. 
Granted, Sykes’s focus is on whether the duty to settle maximizes the joint welfare of the insured 
and insurer, without regard to its effect on tort plaintiffs.  In the example at the start of this Article of the 
quadriplegic plaintiff who sues the defendant motel with the Type II pool, the total payment by the 
motel and its liability insurer, in the absence of the duty to settle, was minimized by rejecting the 
plaintiff’s $100,000 settlement offer at the policy limits and pushing for a settlement at a lower amount.  
Because the insurer would accept an offer to settle at the limits under the duty to settle and would not 
accept it in the absence of the duty to settle, the duty to settle leads to a result that is joint-wealth-
decreasing for the liability insurer and its insured.  See Sykes, supra note 6, at 1362.  The Michigan rule, 
an alternative version of the duty to settle adopted only in Michigan, attempts to account for the 
defendant’s judgment-proof status and might reduce the situations in which the duty to settle is joint-
wealth-decreasing.  See Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co., 461 N.W.2d at 667. 
 69. See Sykes, supra note 6, at 1357.  See also Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 265 (1974) (“The costs of settling a dispute will 
be lower if the outcome is more certain, for there will be less disagreement over the outcome and this 
will facilitate the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory settlement price.”). 
 70. Had plaintiffs, in the years before the duty to settle was embraced, pursued the blood money of 
small business defendants more often, more of those defendants presumably would have filed for 
bankruptcy in response.  The increase in such filings compared to the filings in the years following the 
embrace of the duty to settle should have been measurable, or should have left at least some trace.  The 
absence of any trace suggests that tort plaintiffs in the era before the duty to settle realized how little 
they would gain from forcing the small business defendant into bankruptcy and hence pursued blood 
money as rarely as they do now.  
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liability insurance limits amount to a de facto cap on tort damages is not a legal rule 
of any kind.  Indeed, black-letter tort doctrine ignores the limits of liability 
insurance policies.  Rather, the assumption is a feature of the operation of our tort 
system, of tort law in action, whose significance is increasingly appreciated.  When 
individuals are sued, Professor Baker largely attributes this feature of the law in 
action to an unwritten “union rule” among the plaintiffs’ bar not to seek blood 
money and to confine their reach to the amount of defendant’s insurance.71  Baker 
asserts that the plaintiffs’ bar draws a moral distinction between blood money and 
insurance money and feels moral qualms about pursuing blood money.72  As Baker 
has written: “It’s not that defendants are without any assets . . . but rather that many 
plaintiffs’ lawyers and their clients do not derive enough benefit from taking those 
assets to justify the cost involved.  Significantly, that cost includes a psychological 
or moral component.”73  One might think the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ unwillingness to 
seek blood money puts them in conflict with the interests of their clients.  But 
Baker describes how this conflict is finessed: “For those [clients] who are not able 
to see the wisdom of this approach, practical considerations are packaged with the 
moral ones, so that the client, who would like to go after blood money in a morally 
inappropriate case, is steered away.”74 
To some extent, Baker acknowledges this union rule reflects the self-interest of 
the plaintiff’s bar.  Because defendants resist more vigorously paying blood money 
than insurance money, going after blood money increases the chance of trial and, 
hence, involves far greater delay in collecting any money for the plaintiff.   As a 
result, blood money cases are far more expensive and difficult to litigate.  This 
union rule then effectively raises plaintiffs’ lawyers’ hourly wage in that it avoids 
lawyers spending time seeking money that would be more costly on their part to 
collect.75 
Baker qualifies this assumption.  Taken literally, after all, the assumption 
suggests that all but the wealthiest organizations are foolish to buy any liability 
insurance whatsoever, or at least to buy any policy other than the policy with the 
lowest limits.  In response, Baker reports that the union rule will not apply to 
defendants, fortunately a small minority, who fail to purchase enough liability 
insurance to satisfy the professional expectations of plaintiffs’ lawyers as to what is 
“adequate.”76  This failure to buy adequate liability insurance is viewed by the 
plaintiff’s bar as a moral failing more serious than ordinary negligence and 
sufficiently serious, in some instances, to justify the plaintiff’s pursuit of blood 
money.  What the plaintiff’s bar deems adequate liability insurance turns on several 
factors and is anything but clear.  As Baker writes, the adequate amount “is 
whatever it takes to claim, credibly, that you have satisfied your moral obligation to 
                                                                                                     
 71. See Baker, supra note 11, at 288-89. 
 72. See id. at 288-90.  Among other effects, this distaste for pursuing blood money leads a 
plaintiff’s attorneys to tailor the plaintiff’s claim to fit the available liability insurance.  
 73. Id. at 290. 
 74. Id. at 283. 
 75. Over time, if blood money was regularly pursued, plaintiffs’ attorneys would likely increase the 
contingent fee percentage they charge to reflect the higher costs of recovering blood money. 
 76. Baker, supra note 11, at 296-97. 
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insure.”77  However, the adequate amount typically falls far short of the amount 
needed to keep the defendant from being judgment proof when sued by a severely 
injured plaintiff.  Indeed, the adequate amount can be as low as the amount the 
state legislature or some private gate-keeping institution requires the defendant to 
purchase as a condition of conducting their activities.78  The upshot is that only 
defendants who grossly underinsure need fear an attempt to reach their blood 
money, and even those attempts that are undertaken are likely to be half-hearted.79   
Professor Gilles embraces this assumption as well but attributes it not so much 
to a union rule among attorneys as to the practical difficulties and collection 
expenses of pursuing blood money given the protections individual defendants 
enjoy under a variety of pro-debtor laws.80  These pro-debtor laws pose serious 
legal barriers to plaintiffs’ lawyers in collecting blood money.  Gilles also faults 
Baker for inferring from the existence of a credit industry dedicated to squeezing 
blood money out of the judgment-proof that the legal and practical obstacles to 
collecting that money are frequently overcome.  As Gilles argues: 
[T]he question is not whether defendants could be “forced to pay something.” . . . 
It is whether they could be forced to pay enough to justify the considerable costs 
of getting a judgment and then collecting a portion of it, in the teeth of exemptions 
from collection and the threat of bankruptcy.81 
Injured plaintiffs who sue small businesses that have incorporated will also 
find that the business’ liability insurance limits amount to a de facto cap on their 
tort damages.82  The large majority of such small and medium-size corporations 
have long been able to judgment-proof themselves against having to pay tort 
judgments in excess of their insurance limits through what Professor LoPucki calls 
exemption strategies and secured debt strategies.83  Most “have secured debt that 
exceeds the liquidation value of their assets.”84  While scholars debate whether the 
largest organizations will ever find it cost-effective to judgment-proof themselves 
through more expensive strategies, such as asset secularization or other ownership 
strategies,85 small corporations rarely need to employ such methods.  The median 
                                                                                                     
 77. Id. at 297.  This pressure on the insured to insure adequately offsets the pressure that the duty to 
settle puts on insureds to reduce their policy limit in the hope of inducing plaintiffs to demand less in 
settlement. 
 78. For example, most state parks require by regulation or statute that any recreational vendor 
offering an activity within the park possess some amount of liability insurance coverage. See, e.g., N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 19-5-5(10)(F) (West, Westlaw through Aug. 2009 amendments).  
 79. See Baker, supra note 11, at 288.   
 80. See Gilles, supra note 12, at 606-07.  See also ROBERT J. MINTZ, ASSET PROTECTION FOR 
PHYSICIANS AND HIGH-RISK BUSINESS OWNERS (2008), available at http://www.rjmintz.com/ 
apptoc.htm (describing the wide variety of judgment-proofing strategies available, many of which can 
be taken after being sued as long as judgment has not yet been entered).   
 81. Gilles, supra note 12, at 666 n.280. 
 82. Small businesses organized as partnerships present equally difficult collection problems.  
Family limited partnerships are especially resistant to judgments.  Mintz, supra note 80, at 47. 
 83. LoPucki, supra note 11, at 14-19, 30-32.  See also LoPucki, supra note 12, at 1903-06. 
 84. LoPucki, supra note 11, at 39. 
 85. See James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki’s The Death of 
Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363, 1364 (1998) (arguing that the wealthiest organizations are not likely to 
judgment-proof themselves); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 
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corporation in the American economy is surprisingly small.  For example, the 
median corporation proceeding under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the 
early 1980s had only approximately $250,000 in assets.86  This would suggest that, 
after adjusting for inflation, the corresponding figure today would still be less than 
$500,000.  “Even in the Central District of California, a district notorious for its 
large bankruptcy cases, approximately 45% of the [Chapter 11] cases fall in the 
under-$1-million categories.”87 
Of course, the duty to settle would lose relevance if the limits of the liability 
insurance of small business defendants were high enough.  But the usual limit falls 
far below the typical tort recovery for a severely injured plaintiff.  For example, 
Hansmann and Kraakman report, on the basis of interviews, that at least as of 1990, 
of the roughly 350,000 insurance policies that Aetna writes for the “standard 
market”—which includes all business firms except the Fortune 500—one-third 
have coverage limits of about $300,000 per accident, one-third have limits of 
about $500,000 per accident, and one-third have limits of about $1 million.88 
Perhaps the major contribution of these authors lies in pointing out that a great 
many defendants who have substantial other assets are, nevertheless, de facto 
judgment-proof for amounts beyond the limits of their liability policies.  Whether 
that is due to a “union rule” among the bar, as Baker claims, or unduly pro-debtor 
laws, as Gilles claims, all authors acknowledge that reality.  Were it not for the 
duty to settle, therefore, many more defendants and their liability insurers than one 
might think would be able to exploit the defendants’ judgment-proof status and 
comfortably reject an offer from a severely injured plaintiff to settle at the policy 
limits. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper offers the hypothesis that the duty to settle has contributed to the 
disappearance of certain recreational activities associated with severe injuries and 
usually offered by small businesses.  No matter how free from negligence the 
business offering such an activity might have been, the duty to settle greatly 
magnified the cost of liability coverage for the activity.  Before the duty to settle, 
the policy limits protected the liability insurer against the risk of legal system errors 
resulting in large judgments against its innocent insured.  But the duty to settle 
eviscerated that protection.  While the probability of legal system error remained 
unchanged, the consequences for liability insurers of such errors became 
                                                                                                     
STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (arguing that it is unlikely that innovative business transactions lead to 
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 86. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. TRS., AN EVALUATION OF THE U.S. 
TRUSTEE PILOT PROGRAM FOR BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION 47 tbl.2.1 (1983). 
 87. Lisa Hill Fenning & Craig A. Hart, Measuring Chapter 11: The Real World of 500 Cases, 4 
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unmanageable.  The duty to settle, therefore, drove liability insurers to insist, not 
just that their insureds be free from negligence, but that the insureds sanitize their 
activities so as to disassociate them, to the extent feasible, from any severe injuries 
to potential plaintiffs. 
That an activity generates significant liability exposure does not in itself mean 
the activity will be driven out of existence, as these recreational activities have 
been.  People still drive cars despite the chance of incurring massive liability and 
the resulting expense of liability insurance.  Whether a risky activity survives its 
liability exposure depends on the robustness of the demand for the activity and the 
relative demand for the activity compared to the demand for its next best (and 
presumably safer) substitute, as well as on other factors.   If the consumer demand 
for the recreational activities discussed here were as robust as the demand to drive, 
and the consumer demand for their sanitized substitutes as paltry in comparison as 
is the demand for driving substitutes such as bicycling or walking, perhaps 
recreational vendors would still offer the activities despite their liability.89 
Granted, supporters of internalizing on an activity all the injury costs 
associated with that activity90 would denounce the status quo that existed before the 
duty to settle was embraced.  They would execrate the ability of small business 
recreational vendors, through their judgment-proof status, and the ability of their 
liability insurers, through the policy limits, to externalize the risk of liability for 
severe injuries.  What the supporters of internalization fail to see, alas, is that there 
are many activities, and many other good things in life, that are only feasible if the 
threat of tort liability for the injury risks associated with them is somehow lifted. 
                                                                                                     
 89. The paper does not claim to rule out other possible explanations for the disappearance of these 
activities.  Changing consumer preferences and the general expansion of tort liability are plausible 
explanations as well.  I have discussed before the simultaneity between the modern expansion of tort 
liability and the disappearance of recreational activities which seem reasonably safe, i.e., activities that 
would not seem to lead to liability under the correct application of negligence principles.  See Heidt, 
supra note 34, at 414 (discussing possible legal and non-legal changes which may have contributed to 
the disappearance of certain recreational activities).   
 90. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
117 (1970). 
